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TAXING INTERSTATE COMMERCE:
A NEW EXPERIENCE IN INDIANA
Carlyn E. Johnson*
THE FIsCAL PROBLEM AND SOLUTION
The 93rd Indiana General Assembly, meeting for 101 days in 1963, com,
pletely revised the state's tax structure by the adoption of two new acts. The
Legislature enacted a two per cent sales and use tax within the framework of the
gross income tax; increased the gross income tax rates by one-third;' and enacted
a new two per cent adjusted gross income tax, applicable to both individuals and
corporations. The latter is essentially a flat-rate net income tax2 and is herein-
after referred to as such.
Such sweeping tax legislation had not been passed since the Gross Income
Tax was enacted in 1933.' But, as in 1933, the state in 1963 faced a financial
crisis. The 1961 General Assembly had deliberately passed a deficit budget.4
By mid-1962 state officials realized that the deficit would be even greater than
had been anticipated by the legislators because gross income tax collections were
considerably lower than the revenue forecasts on which the state's 1961-63
biennial budget had been based.5 Before the 1963 General Assembly convened,
* Editor, Indiana State Bar Association Journal; former staff member, Indiana Com-
mission on State Tax and Financing Policy; A.B., Cornell University, 1956; J.D., Indiana
University School of Law, 1963.
1 Ind. Acts of 1963, Ch. 30, (Special Session). The sales tax is an amendment to the
gross income tax and applies to all transactions which constitute "selling at retail" under the
gross income tax. The amendment, for purposes of the sales tax only, also placed within the defi-
nition of "selling at retail" sales of utility services for domestic or commercial use and the
rental of transient lodgings for periods of less than 30 days. Section 21 of the same act (IND.
STAT. ANN. § 64-2603, Burns 1963 Special Supp.) increased the gross income tax rates from
Ys of 1% to V2 of 1% on receipts derived from selling at retail, wholesale sales, laundry and
dry cleaning, and display advertising, and increased the rate from 1Y2 to 2% on all other
receipts. The constitutionality of this act was upheld in October of 1963 in Welsh v. Sells,
192 N.E.2d 753 (Ind. 1963).
2 Ind. Acts of 1963, Ch. 32, (Special Session). The adjusted gross income tax applies to
all resident individuals, trusts and estates, and to all nonresidents and all corporations having
income from sources within the state. Section 204 of the statute (IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-
3219, Bums 1963 Special Supp.) provides an apportionment formula for those nonresidents
and corporations who cannot separate their income from sources within and without the state.
The entire net income of any such taxpayer is multiplied by the average of three fractions -
taxpayer's property in Indiana divided by his property everywhere, his payroll in Indiana
divided by his payroll everywhere, and his sales in Indiana divided by his sales everywhere.
Section 701 of the act (IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-3249, Burns 1963 Special Supp.) relieves indi-
viduals subject to the adjusted gross income tax act from liability for the gross income tax.
Corporations remain subject to the gross income tax, but section 302 (IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-
3221, Bums 1963 Special Supp.) grants them a credit against adjusted gross income tax liability
for gross income taxes paid. See text, infra, at notes 12 through 14.
3 Ind. Acts of 1933, ch. 50.
4 In the 1961-63 Biennial Budget (Ind. Acts of 1961, Ch. 298) general fund appropria-
tions exceeded anticipated general fund revenues by approximately $24 million.
5 The Advisory Committee on General Fund Revenues had forecast gross income tax
collections of $199,689,000 for fiscal year 1961, and $213,068,000 for fiscal year 1962. Actual
collections were $192,027,000 in fiscal year 1961 and $202,376,000 in fiscal year 1962. Advi-
sory Committee on General Fund Revenues, The Outlook for Business Conditions and for Gen-
eral Fund Revenues in Indiana, Fiscal Years 1963, 1964 and 1965, p. 15. This meant not only
that revenues during the biennium were lower than had been anticipated, but also that the
state commenced the 1961-63 biennium with a considerably smaller surplus than legislators had
expected.
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the State Budget Agency was predicting that by the close of fiscal 1963 the
state's surplus would be reduced to a deficit figure.6
Augmenting the demand for increased state revenues was the hue and cry
heard all over the state for relief from ever-increasing local property taxes.
Sixty thousand new pupils were expected to enter the state's public school
system during the 1963-65 biennium. Educational costs are currently approxi-
mately $500 per child per year,' thus the 30,000 new children added to the
school system in each of two years would cost about $45,000,000 to educate
during that two-year period. Unless the state increased the amount it contributed
to local schools, the entire $45 million would have to come from local property
taxes. Further, other school costs were continuing to rise.9
These factors, combined with a host of others, created an urgent demand
for an increase in state revenues" and sent legislators scurrying in search of
previously untapped revenue sources. One such source was business whose
receipts are derived partly or wholly from interstate commerce. Such receipts
have always been exempt from the gross income tax. While legislators had been
cautioned that the state could not look to this source for any substantial amount
of revenue," nevertheless many regarded this omission as a serious tax loophole.
6 State Budget Committee, State of Indiana Budget Report for the Biennium July 1, 1963,
to June 30, 1965 (1962), p. 3. The estimate at that time was $5,897,093. That estimate was,
in fact, too low. The actual unappropriated surplus in the state's general fund on June 30,
1963, was $4,632,023. State of Indiana, Annual Report of the Auditor of State for the Fiscal
Year ending June 30, 1963, p. 9. In 1954, the state's unappropriated surplus was $74.5 mil-
lion. It has dwindled more or less steadily since then, dropping an unprecedented $23.4 million
in fiscal year 1963 - from $28.0 million on June 30, 1962, to $4.6 million on June 30, 1963.
See Auditor's Annual Reports, supra, for the years 1954 through 1962.
7 Indiana State Teachers Association, Special Tabulation No. 7, Comparison of Total Ex-
penditures for Current Expense, Capital Outlay, and Interest and State Distributions to Local
School Corporations on the Basis of Total Amounts, Percentages, and Amounts per Pupil Based
on Grand Total Enrollments, 1949-50 - 1962-63 (September, 1962).
8 Calculated from the National Education Association, Research Report 1963 - R12,
Estimates of School Statistics, 1963-64, Tables 3 and 11. The estimated total school enrollment
in Indiana is 1,110,020 and the estimated total current expenditure, capital outlay and interest
is $560 million, making a per pupil cost of $504.
9 Indiana State Teachers Association, Research Report, Actual Expenditures for School
Fiscal Years and Bienniums for the Period from 1953-54 through 1960-61, and Estimated Ex-
penditures for School Fiscal Years and Bienniums for the Period from 1961-62 through 1964-
65, (January 7, 1963). The biennial cost increases since 1957-59 (including those occasioned by
the increased number of students) have been in the neighborhood of 25 to 26% per biennium.
10 Indiana was not alone in its need for increased state revenues. 25 CCH, STATE TAx
REv. No. 2, January 14, 1964, documents the tremendous volume of state tax legislation
enacted in 1963. Seven states raised their sales tax rates, fifteen increased tobacco taxes, three
raised gasoline taxes and five states altered their personal or corporate income tax rates.
Theodore H. White, in his Pulitzer Prize winning documentary book, The Making of
the President 1960, recounts at the beginning of Chapter 8 a conversation with an aide
to the Governor of Wisconsin in which the aide pointed out the revenue problems besetting
Wisconsin because of the tremendous increases in population over the last decade. White indi-
cates that these problems were not unique to Wisconsin and, in a footnote to the conversation,
(p. 256, Cardinal Edition, Pocket Books, Inc.) observes:
It is noteworthy that the chief casualties, in both parties in the fall elec-
tions later in 1960 were governors beset by such problems as these. There
were twenty-seven governors of the union up for reelection in the Presiden-
tial year, and twelve governorships changed hands, largely because of grass-
roots tax revolts.
11 The Legislature was told that a 2% corporate net income tax with the gross income tax
as a minimum alternative would produce only about $10 million over the biennium. Commis-
sion on State Tax and Financing Policy, Key Points and Summary of Senate-House Conference
Committee on H. B. 1226 and H. B. 1509 (Mimeo, April 17, 1963).
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If new or higher taxes were to be levied on other taxpayers, interstate businesses
should begin to pay something to the state for services provided.
The Legislature chose to close this loophole by levying a net income tax
on all corporations in addition to the gross income tax to which they were
already subject, while at the same time granting corporations a credit against
net income tax liability (not to exceed that liability) for gross income taxes
imposed for the same taxable year. 2 Corporations, therefore, now pay either a
net or a gross income tax, whichever is greater. Obviously, except in rare in-
stances,"s a tax of 2% of apportioned net income will produce a tax liability in
excess of a tax of 2 of 1% (or 2%, depending on the source of receipts) of
gross income only if at least a substantial portion of the taxpayer's gross re-
ceipts are exempt from the gross income tax. Gross receipts derived from inter-
state commerce are so exempt.' Accordingly, the credit provision in the adjusted
gross income tax act effectively limits its application, insofar as corporations
are concerned, to those operating in interstate commerce. All other corporations
will simply continue to pay the gross income tax (at increased rates).
At least two other methods for taxing these multistate corporations were
available to the General Assembly. The state could have imposed a net income
tax on all corporations, or it could have enacted an apportionment formula with-
in the framework of the existing gross income tax. It is here proposed to examine
these three alternatives: to speculate on the Legislature's reasons for selecting
the method it did; and to discuss the constitutional questions raised by each
method, in light of the most recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
THE CORPORATE NET INCOME TAx
One constitutionally acceptable method for a state to reach receipts from
interstate commerce is to impose a corporate net income tax on all corporations.
Thirty-seven states aside from Indiana now do so. It seems to be well settled
since the 1959 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota that such a tax, if properly
apportioned to reflect an appropriate connection with business done in the taxing
state, violates neither the commerce nor the due process clause of the federal
Constitution, even though the income taxed is derived exclusively from inter-
state commerce.
There are, of course, certain hazards which a state must avoid in levying
such a tax. For example, the statute must clearly state that the tax is imposed on
net income and is not one levied for the privilege of engaging in business in the
12 IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-3221 (Burns Special Supp. 1963). Unincorporated businesses
are now subject to the net income tax act as individuals. If they are residents, it appears that
Indiana has jurisdiction to tax them on their entire net income, whether earned in interstate or
intrastate commerce. See Barrett, "Substance" vs. "Form" in the Application of the Com-
merce Clause to State Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. Rav. 740, 755, nn. 45 & 45a (1953). If they
are nonresidents with income from sources within and without the state, they may apportion
their income as corporations do. IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-3210 (Burns Special Supp. 1963).
13 If a wholly intrastate corporation whose entire receipts were taxable at '/2 of 1% oper-
ated at any profit margin in excess of 25%, its net income tax liability would exceed its gross
income tax liability.
14 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S.
307 (1938).
15 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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state measured by net income. Ironically, this is true even though the economic
effect of either tax might be exactly the same. In Spector Motor Service, Inc.
v. O'Connor"8 the United States Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut
franchise tax measured by apportioned net income but levied for the privilege
of engaging in business in the state as it applied to a foreign corporation con-
ducting an exclusively interstate transportation business in the state. Confronted
with this decision, the court in Northwestern distinguished it, observing that the
Connecticut tax was unconstitutional because no state may tax the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce. Minnesota's tax was also based on apportioned
net income, but as applied to corporations doing interstate business it was not
called a franchise or privilege tax. 7
Some form of a corporate net income tax has been introduced in every
session of the Indiana General Assembly since 1957, but it has met defeat each
time."8 There are numerous influential economic interests in Indiana unalterably
opposed to the concept of a state corporate net income tax. 9 Furthermore, it
16 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
17 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.02 (1962) levies an excise tax on all domestic corporations
for the privilege of doing business. Section 290.03 (1962) levies a direct tax on the net income
of all domestic and foreign corporations whose business is exclusively interstate, but exempts all
corporations subject to tax under § 290.02.
Three other states which levy a corporate net income tax employ this dual nomenclature.
CALIF. REV. AND TAx CODE §§ 23151, 23501 (1963 Supp.); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 317.055,
317.060, 317.070, 317.074, 318.020 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 §§ 3420c, 3420n-3
(1963 Supp.). As applied to domestic corporations, the tax is called an excise, fran-
chise or privilege tax, but as applied to all other corporations, it is termed simply a tax on net
income. (In the case of Pennsylvania, it is called a property tax measured by net income.)
18 In 1957, it took the form of a net worth tax (H. B. 405). In 1959, it was a tax at
graduated rates to be paid on either gross or adjusted gross income, with the gross income tax
retained as a minimum alternative (H. B. 536). In 1961, a flat rate corporate net income tax
was introduced as a Senate Finance Committee amendment to H. B. 53. The vote on passage
of the amended bill in the Senate was 25 "ayes" and 25 "nays" with the President of the Senate
casting the deciding negative vote. In 1963, essentially the same bill was introduced in the
Senate as a second reading amendment to H. B. 1509. It was adopted in the Senate by a vote
of 25 "ayes" to 23 "nays," but the amendment was rejected by the House.
19 The present gross income tax structure favors the type of business which operates with
a low-turnover and high profit margin per unit sold. Compare, for example, two hypothetical
business enterprises, each showing the same profit for a given year's operation - one a retailer,
the other a manufacturer. The retailer, who depends for his profit upon a low markup and
high-turnover of inventory will have higher gross receipts than the manufacturer and will,
therefore, pay more in gross income taxes. According to the figures in the U.S. TREASURY DE-
PARTMENT, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME . . . 1960-61, CORPORATION
INCOME TAX RETURNS, Table 20, manufacturing corporations produced $1.00 of net income
for each $16.46 in business receipts, while retail trade corporations required $56.53 in business
receipts to produce $1.00 of net income.
In Indiana, in 1962, manufacturing industries were the source of 42.3% of the earnings
of all employed (including self-employed) individuals in the state, while retail and wholesale
trade supplied only 16.9% of those earnings. (Calculated from U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, August, 1963, Table 70. The percentages for the
year 1961 are approximately the same.) In spite of this disparity in size of contribution to
the state's economy, and contrary to what might be expected, the retail trade segment of
Indiana's economy paid almost twice as much as the manufacturing segment paid in gross
income taxes in the years 1961 and 1962. The actual amounts are:
Amount of Gross % of Total Amount of Gross % of Total
Year Income Tax Paid Gross Income Income Tax Paid Gross Income
by Retail Trade Tax Paid by by Manufacturing Tax Paid by
Retail Trade Manufacturing
1961 $25,370,000 14.7% $12,946,000 7.5%
1962 $26,801,989 14.2% $14,966,552 7.9%
Calculated from the Division of Data Processing, Indiana Department of Administration,
Annual Statistical Report of Department of Revenue, Table 6, 1961 and 1962.
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should be noted that the gross income tax is a prodigious producer of revenue,
even at very low rates. In the calendar year 1962 corporations paid $69.8
million in gross income taxes - $34.8 million at the rate of 3/8 of 1% and
$35 million at IT2,%.20 The State Budget Agency estimates that in the 1963-65
biennium corporations will pay more than $220 million in gross income taxes
alone.21 Although it is difficult to predict accurately revenues from a corporate
net income tax, economists estimate that in Indiana it would take a flat rate
tax of between 6% and 8% on'corporate net income to equal the amount pro-
duced from the corporate gross income tax. Obviously, advocating a raise in tax
rates by as much as 1,500%, albeit employing a wholly, different base, would
be a politically unpopular (if not suicidal) position for a state legislator to take.
APPORTIONED GROSS INCOME TAx
Another possible method whereby Indiana could tax receipts from inter-
state commerce would be to apportion gross receipts so that the state's present
gross income tax would, theoretically, apply only to those receipts attributable
to business done in the state. Whether or not such a scheme would survive a
commerce clause challenge can be only a matter of speculation at this point,
since the precise issue has never been before the courts. But there have been
several recent cases dealing with state taxation on an apportioned basis of gross
receipts derived from interstate transportation. Perhaps a trend is evident from
these decisions, indicating how the United States Supreme Court would treat
a state gross income tax levied on all intrastate and interstate receipts if that
gross income tax were apportioned to reflect business done in the taxing state.
In the 1918 decision in United States Glue v. Town of Oak Creek,2" the
United States Supreme Court, in upholding a state net income tax, stated what it
considered to be the difference between taxing net income and gross receipts:
The difference, in effect, between a tax measured by gross
receipts and one measured by net income, recognized by our deci-
sions, is manifest and substantial, and it affords a convenient and
workable basis of distinction between a direct and immediate burden
upon the business affected and a charge that is only indirect and
incidental. A tax upon gross receipts affects each transaction in pro-
portion to its magnitude and irrespective of whether it is profitable
or otherwise. Conceivably it may be sufficient to make the difference
between profit and loss, or to so diminish the profit as to impede or
discourage the conduct of the commerce. A tax upon the net profits
has not the same deterrent effect, since it does not arise at all unless
20 Statistical Report of Department of Revenue supra, note 19, 1962, Table 12. In calen-
dar year 1961, corporations paid $33.4 million at 1 4% and $32.2 million at Y8 of 1%. Statisti-
cal Report, supra, 1961, Table 12.
21 Indiana State Budget Agency 1963-65 Biennial Budget As Passed by the 1963 General
Assembly, pp. 6 & 7. Part of the anticipated increase over the amount paid in the 1961-63
biennium in corporate gross income taxes is due to the increase in rates and part is due to an
expected increase in general economic activity. The shift in the tax base from a gross to a net
income concept for some corporations will not result in any decrease in state revenue because
the corporations which will now be subject to the net income tax have paid little or no gross in-
come taxes in the past.
22 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
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a gain is shown over and above expenses and losses, and the tax
cannot be heavy unless the profits are large.23
In general, state gross receipts taxes as applied to receipts from interstate
commerce have fared badly in the hands of the Supreme Court. Such taxes
usually have been struck down because they imposed a "direct burden" on inter-
state commerce,2 or because more than one state could tax the same income,
thereby subjecting commerce to a "cumulative" or "multiple" burden.25
Indiana's gross income tax, in its thirty years of judicial history, has been called
both a direct and a multiple burden on interstate commerce.26
How would Indiana's gross income tax fare if subjected to a test on the
issue of constitutionality, after being amended to tax interstate commerce by
means of an apportionment formula? Would an apportioned comprehensive
gross receipts tax survive commerce clause objections? If the Supreme Court
chooses to regard a possible cumulative tax burden as the relevant criterion, an
apportionment formula would appear to overcome this objection. Such a formula,
at least in theory, allows a state to tax only that portion of a business' receipts
attributable to activities carried on within that state. On the other hand, if the
court chooses to object to a gross receipts tax, not because of possible multistate
taxation, but because it imposes a direct burden on interstate commerce, an ap-
portionment formula will not cure this defect. Even an apportioned gross receipts
levy will tax each transaction in proportion to its magnitude without regard to
profitability. An apportionment formula can only prevent multistate taxation
of the same receipts.
The states in the past have not been prevented entirely from taxing gross
receipts from interstate commerce. The court has consistently upheld two forms
of such taxes - those levied only on some local activity, and those levied in
lieu of all other property taxes the state could impose.
A. Taxes on a Local Activity
Indiana's gross income tax, as applied to specific transactions, has been sus-
tained several times by the United States Supreme Court on the theory that
23 Id. at 328.
24 Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947) (New York City);
Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Commission, 297 U.S. 650 (1936) (Washington); Crew
Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917) (Pennsylvania); Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S.
230 (1887) (Michigan); Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326
(1887) (Pennsylvania).
25 Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., supra, note 24; Gwin, White & Prince Inc.
v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939) (Washington).
26 In Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938), the court objected to
Indiana's tax because of a possible multistate taxation of the same receipts. In Freeman v.
Hewit 329 U.S. 249 (1946), the court was content to call the tax, among other things, a direct,
forbidden imposition on the very processes of interstate commerce.
27 In fact, because all states do not use the same formula, and because the same terms are
defined differently by different states, an interstate business may actually be taxed on more or
less than exactly 100% of its income. For a discussion of this problem and of the need for
Congressional action in this area, see Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from a
Multistate Business, 13 VAND. L. REV. 21, 64-81 and 117-126 (1959). The whole problem of
state taxation of interstate commerce has been under intensive study by a special subcommittee
of the House Judiciary and Senate Finance Committees of the United States Congress. In
June, 1964, this subcommittee issued a lengthy report describing its findings on the complexities
and conflicts in state corporate income taxes and calling for legislative action by the Congress
on these problems.
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Indiana was taxing only a local event even though the receipts taxed seemed to
be from an interstate transaction. For example, in Department of Treasury
v. Wood Preserving Corp.,2" the delivery of railroad ties in Indiana
to an out-of-state buyer was held to be a local, taxable activity even though the
buyer immediately shipped the ties out of the state. In International Harvester
v. Department of Treasury," where goods were shipped from outside the state
to a buyer in Indiana or shipped from Indiana to an out-of-state buyer who took
delivery in Indiana, the transactions were taxable as local events. In Department
of Treasury v. Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co.,"0 where stove parts were shipped
into Indiana to be enameled and then shipped out again, taxation of the
transactions was held permissible as a local event.
In the very recent case of General Motors v. Washington,"1 the United
States Supreme Court upheld the State of Washington's gross receipts tax levied
for the privilege of doing business as applied to sales by General Motors to
Washington dealers, many of which were handled through an Oregon zone
office or an Oregon warehouse. The court begins with the proposition that:
It is well established that taxation measured by gross receipts is
constitutionally proper if it is fairly apportioned.3 2
Although no apportionment formula was applied to the proceeds here being
taxed and the tax was therefore "suspect" in the words of the court, nevertheless,
the court felt there was sufficient local activity to make the tax constitutional. As
to General Motors' claim of multiple taxation, the opinion, quoting from the
Northwestern case, states, vaguely:
"The taxpayers must show that the formula places a burden on
interstate commerce in a constitutional sense." This it has not done.3 3
According to the dissenters:
It is difficult to conceive of a state gross receipts tax on interstate
commerce which could not be sustained under the rationale adopted
today.34
The "local activity" rationale has also been used to sustain a tax on a
privilege or franchise, the value of which is measured by gross receipts including
receipts from interstate sales, on the theory that the privilege of engaging in
business in a state, which the court views as the local activity, is made more
valuable because the company is also engaged in interstate commerce. The gross
receipts may be the sole'measure of the value of the local activity 5 or they may
be part of an apportionment formula designed to measure taxable income, as
long as what is being taxed is only a local event. For example, in International
Harvester v. Evatt,6 the United States Supreme Court sustained an Ohio fran-
chise tax on all foreign corporations levied for the privilege of doing business in
said: "Words in early times, like form in a document or pleading were all important." Corn-
the state, and measured by a two-factor formula: property and business done
28 313 U.S. 62 (1941).
29 322 U.S. 340 (1944).
30 313 U.S. 252 (1941).
31 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
32 Id. at 440.
33 Id. at 449.
34 Id. at 456.
35 American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
36 329 U.S. 416 (1947).
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(gross receipts). Included in "business done in Ohio" were the sales price of
all goods manufactured in Ohio regardless of where they were shipped and the
total of all sales made to Ohio customers through Ohio sales agencies, even
though the goods were shipped to the Ohio customers from out of state. The
court said that the inclusion of the sales price of all goods manufactured in Ohio
was justified because it was simply a measure of the value of the manufacturing
business, and the inclusion of all sales made to Ohio customers was justified be-
cause it was intrastate business. However, the court qualified the inclusion of
Ohio sales thusly:
What effect inclusion of this element in the "business done"
numerator would have were those transactions not intrastate is a
question we need not now decide.3 7
The Court concluded that the formula was valid because it was used only to
arrive at a fair determination of the value of the intrastate business for which
the franchise was granted.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp,"8 Texas levied a franchise tax on
the outstanding capital of all corporations based on the proportion that gross
receipts in the state bore to total gross receipts of the company. By the formula,
Ford, which sent parts into Texas for assembly and intrastate sale to dealers,
paid a state tax on $23,000,000 when the book value of all of its assets in Texas
was only $3,000,000. The court sustained the tax, recognizing that a local
privilege or franchise is made more valuable because the company is engaged in
interstate as well as intrastate business. But the tax was considered only a tax
on the value of the privilege of engaging in business in the state, which was a
local activity.
Would this "local activity" rationale sustain an apportioned Indiana gross
income tax as a tax on a privilege, the value of which is measured by gross
receipts? In the case of Miles v. Department of Treasury,"9 the Indiana
Supreme Court characterized the Indiana gross income tax as:
an excise, levied upon those domiciled within the state or
who derive income from sources within the state, upon the basis of
the privilege of domicile or the privilege of transacting business
within the state and that the burden may reasonably be measured
by the amount of income. (Emphasis supplied.) 40
If the Indiana gross income tax is a tax on the privilege of engaging in business
in the state, the value of which is measured by gross receipts, perhaps inclusion
in the tax base of apportioned gross receipts of a multistate business, reflecting
accurately the amount of business activity carried on within the state, would not
be objectionable.
But even assuming that the "local activity" theory would sustain an ap-
portioned gross receipts tax insofar as the apportionment formula measures only
the value of the in-state business, reliance on such a theory leaves unanswered the
question of whether apportioned gross receipts would be taxable if those receipts
were exclusively from interstate commerce - the kind of income in question
37 Id. at 421.
38 308 U.S. 331 (1939).
39 209 Ind. 172, 199 N.E. 372 (1935).
40 Id. at 188, 199 N.E. at 379.
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in the Northwestern case. An apportionment formula cannot measure the value
of the local activities of the corporation in such a case, because none have'oc-
curred. The United States Supreme Court skirted the issue in International
Harvester v. Evatt," by avoiding a decision on the validity of including receipts
from interstate transactions in the gross receipts factor of the apportionment
formula.
B. In Lieu of Taxation
States may also levy a gross receipts tax if it is in lieu -of, and a fair substitute
for, all other property taxes which the state could levy' on the theory that if the
business would be subject to a property tax, then an equal burden in the form
of a franchise tax should not constitute a difference of constitutional significance. 8
A recent, and, from the point of view of this discussion, the most important
case upholding such a tax is Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia." In that
case, a Virginia statute levied a franchise tax of 2.15% on express com-
panies' gross receipts earned in the state, including receipts from business
passing through, into or out of the state. The tax was in lieu of the property
tax which the state could have levied on the company's rolling stock and in-
tangible property. On its tax return, REA stated it had no way of determining
what part of its receipts were earned in Virginia from business passing through,
into or out of the state. So the State Tax Commission devised an apportionment
formula by computing the proportion of national mileage travelled in Virginia
by six railroads and five airlines used by REA to transport express. This same
proportion of REA's entire national gross receipts was ascribed to Virginia and
the tax computed accordingly. The action was sustained by the United States
Supreme Court on the ground that the tax was in lieu of any property taxes
which the state could have levied. But the fact that the tax REA paid on its
apportioned gross receipts was more than nineteen times its possible property tax
liability would seem to indicate that the "in lieu" feature of the tax was not
the only reason for sustaining it. These facts were before the court, but it put
them aside saying:
While the tax is in lieu of other property taxes which Virginia
can legally assess and should be their just equivalent in amount...
we will not inquire into the exactitudes of the formula where appel-
lant has not shown it to be so baseless as to violate due process.46
41 See text following note 36 supra.
42 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959); Illinois Central R. R. v.
Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450 (1918);
U.S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335 (1912).
43 The Supreme Court 1958 Term, 73 HAxv. L. REv. 84, 174 (1959).
44 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
45 The property tax which the state could have levied (based on the rate applied to the
rolling stock of other railway and freight car companies) amounted to $7,235.76 while the fran-
chise tax levied in lieu therof was $139,739. 66. The majority on the court viewed the difference
as reflecting only the amount the state could have levied as a property tax on the company'i in-
tangible property-in this case, its going-concern value. But as pointed out by Mr. Justice
Brennan in his concurring opinion, Virginia did not, in fact, levy any such tax on the going-
concern value of other businesses, nor had she ever previously levied such a tax on express
companies. In other words, the court was willing to assume a great deal in construing this
apportioned gross receipts tax as equivalent to a state property tax.
46 Id. at 436.
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Justice Brennan concurred in the result stating that he thought the tax should
be called what it really was, viz., a tax on apportioned gross receipts:
To me, the more realistic way of reviewing the tax and evaluat-
ing its constitutional validity is to take it as what it is in substance,
a levy on gross receipts fairly apportionable to the taxing State.41
Nonetheless, this "in lieu of" feature cannot be lightly put aside. The same
Virginia tax had been before the court in 195448 and at that time was held
unconstitutional. The only differences between the tax in 1954 and in 1959,
when it was held to be valid, were that in 1954 it was called a license tax for
the privilege of engaging in business in the state and was in addition to the state
property tax; in 1959 it was called a franchise tax and was in lieu of the property
tax. The measure of the tax, i.e., 2.15% of apportioned gross receipts, was
exactly the same.
Taken at face value, the constitutionality of the 1959 Virginia tax turned
on the fact that it was in lieu of the state property tax; therefore, it would not
be precedent for sustaining an apportioned gross income tax in Indiana. But if
the "in lieu of" feature was the expedient which the court needed to sustain
this tax without overruling the previous REA decision and if, in fact, the court
was actually sustaining an apportioned tax on gross receipts including receipts
from interstate sales, perhaps a similar apportioned gross income tax in Indiana
would be constitutional.
Two other cases bear mention in this discussion. In Central Greyhound
Lines, Inc. v. Mealey,49 while holding unconstitutional an unapportioned tax on
gross receipts from transportation beginning and ending in one state but passing
through two others, the United States Supreme Court said that such a tax, even
though imposed directly on gross receipts from interstate commerce, would be
constitutional if properly apportioned to prevent the commerce from being
subject to a multiple tax burden.
And in Interstate Oil Pipeline v. Stone,"0 the court upheld a Mississippi
tax on gross receipts derived from the transportation of oil within the state but
intended for shipment in interstate commerce. All the members of the court
conceded that receipts from interstate commerce were being taxed, but, said
the four who joined in the majority opinion, "The statute is not invalidated by
the commerce clause . ..merely because . .. it imposes a 'direct' tax on the
'privilege' of engaging in interstate commerce.""1 They were satisfied that the
tax was constitutional since no other state could tax the same income, even
though the tax was laid directly on interstate commerce. A fifth justice concurred
on the ground that only a local activity was being taxed.5"
To date, the cases which have or would have sustained apportioned gross
receipts taxes have been in the area of transportation. But the same reasoning
47 Id. at 447.
48 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
49 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
50 337 U.S. 662 (1949).
51 Id. at 666.
52 Unfortunately, this case will not serve as precedent in future gross receipts tax cases
because a majority of the court did not agree on the principles of law involved. For the effect
of decisions by an equally divided court, see, United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942)
and Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1910).
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should apply to the receipts of a multistate manufacturing or merchandising
enterprise. In line with the court's frequent statements that interstate commerce
should pay its way, the trend of the decisions seems to be toward allowing
states to use gross receipts as well as net income as a measure of value."
COMBINATION NET AND GROSS INCOME TAx
What might be the judicial fate of the dual net and gross income structure as
adopted by the 93rd General Assembly if its constitutionality is challenged? As
previously described, 4 Indiana now has two entirely different corporate taxes
- a gross income tax applying to intrastate businesses and a net income tax
applying chiefly to interstate businesses.55 The Legislature's reasons for adopting
this hybrid tax structure were discussed earlier. Briefly, shifting entirely to a
corporate net income tax is extremely unpopular politically, and an appor-
tioned gross income tax is still subject to much constitutional uncertainty.
Leaving aside the problem of the economic "unneutrality" to which -cor-
porations and other businesses are now subject in Indiana,5" the question to be
answered is whether a state may single out interstate commerce and impose on
it a tax different from that to which local business is subject. The answer is
probably "yes" as long as the tax does not discriminate against the interstate
commerce. A concise definition of what constitutes "discrimination" against inter-
state commerce is not easy to find. Certain taxes have been struck down as being
discriminatory on their face.57 Others have failed because they imposed a heavier
burden on out-of-state than on local business.58 The court has looked with par-
ticular disfavor on fixed license fees on solicitors, since the out-of-state traveling
53 For example, in the 1954 Railway Express case, supra note 48, the court had this to say
about gross receipts as a measure of value:
But we have declined to regard mere gross receipts as a sound measure
of going-concern value in a practical world of commerce, where values de-
-pend on profitableness of a business, not merely its volume (at 367).
By 1959, when it reconsidered Virginia's tax, supra note 44, the court had changed its mind to
this extent:
While it may be true that gross receipts are not the best measure (of
going-concern value), it is too late now to question its constitutionality (at
441).
The change in attitude becomes even more graphic when the statement in the later Railway
Express case is compared with the court's earlier dissatisfaction with gross receipts taxes ex-
pressed in the U.S. Glue case, supra note 22:
• . . (a tax on gross receipts) may be sufficient to make the difference be-
tween profit and loss, or to so diminish the profit as to impede or discourage
the conduct of the commerce (at 329).
54 See text at notes 12, 13 and 14, supra.
55 No other state has this kind of twofold income tax structure. As pointed out in note
17, supra, four of the states imposing a corporate net income tax call it by a different name as
it applies to interstate business, but local and interstate corporations are taxed alike.
56 Indiana now taxes local unincorporated businesses on net income, interstate corporations
on apportioned net income and intrastate corporations on gross income. This unneutral eco-
nomic treatment is almost certain to generate intense pressures for further changes in the state's
tax structure at the next session of the General Assembly.
57 E.g., Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1880) -a county license tax on agents selling
goods manufactured in other states, from which resident manufacturers selling goods produced
in the state were exempt; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1879) - a city wharfage 'fee levied
only on products from states other than Maryland; and Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875)
- a state tax on peddlers selling wares not manufactured in that state.
58 Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
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seller might be subject to a new fee each time he moved, while the local merchant
need pay only once. 9
But a tax on interstate commerce different from that imposed on local busi-
ness is not, in itself, enough to constitute discrimination. In Interstate Busses
Corp. v. Blodgett, ° Connecticut levied a tax of one cent per mile traveled by
each motor vehicle used in interstate commerce. Intrastate motor bus transporta-
tion companies paid no mileage tax but instead a tax of 31% of gross receipts.
Both intrastate and interstate companies paid property, license and gasoline
taxes. The court said:
To gain the relief for which it prays appellant (Interstate Busses
Corporation) is under the necessity of showing that in actual prac-
tice the tax of which it complains falls with disproportionate eco-
nomic weight on it.61
And in West Publishing Co. v. McColgan,"2 a challenge of California's net
income tax on interstate corporations, the California Supreme Court said:
It is settled that a tax does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce if other related taxes impose equal burdens on local
commerce.
63
Under the Indiana income tax statutes, all corporations 4 which derive in-
come from sources in the state must, in effect, compute both their gross and
their net income tax liability and pay whichever is higher. This means that
although some interstate corporations will now be paying taxes to the state of
Indiana which they may never have done before, nevertheless, all local corpora-
tions will be subject to an equal, or greater tax burden. Discrimination would
not seem to exist in such a situation. Local commerce will pay a different tax,
but one equally or more burdensome than that paid by interstate commerce.
But even assuming a tax on interstate commerce is nondiscriminatory it may
still be unconstitutional if levied on the privilege of engaging in interstate com-
merce. 61 Indiana's new corporate adjusted gross income tax is not denominated
a franchise or privilege tax and appears to be simply a tax on adjusted gross
income.6" Might it be argued, however, that since it will apply only to corpora-
tions operating in interstate commerce it amounts, in effect, to a tax upon the
privilege of engaging in such commerce? Perhaps some support for such an
argument can be found in the methods available to the state for collecting the tax.
Numerous cases have said that if payment of a tax is made a condition
precedent to engaging in interstate business in the state, the tax becomes a for-
bidden privilege taxY.6 Even as late as the Northwestern case, the court, in de-
59 Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Company, Inc. v. Maxwell,
311 U.S. 454 (1940).
60 276 U.S. 245 (1928).
61 Id. at 251.
62 27 Cal.2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1949), aff'd. 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
63 Id. at 710, 166 P.2d at 864. See also Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932).
64 Except those corporations with ten or fewer stockholders all of whom are residents of
Indiana and who have elected to be taxed as partnerships for federal income tax purposes.
IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-3249 (Burns 1963 Special Supp.) exempts such corporations from
liability for either gross or adjusted gross income taxes.
- 65 See text at notes 16 and 17, supra.
-66 IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-3218 (Burns 1963 Special Supp.).
67 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 (1914); Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910).
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ciding whether the tax on interstate business was a privilege tax, gave weight
to the fact that Minnesota was left to collect the tax only through an ordinary
debt action. 8 The collection provisions in the Indiana adjusted gross income
tax statute are somewhat different from Minnesota's. In the main, they are the
same as those found in the gross income tax act. In addition to giving the state
the right to collect the tax in a debt action, the statute provides that:
Any taxpayer against whom a tax shall be assessed as herein
provided shall be restrained and enjoined upon the order of the
department (of Revenue) . . . from engaging or continuing in
business until the taxes shall have been paid.69 (Emphasis supplied.)
Provision is also made for the appointment of a receiver." Thus the state is given
the right to prevent business from being done until the tax is paid. This collec-
tion provision would, at the very least, aid an argument that this is a tax on the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. On the other hand, the adjusted
gross income tax act contains a severability clause."1 Perhaps a court, even if un-
sympathetic to the tax, would hold that only the injunction and receivership
provisions of the statute are invalid, leaving the state to an ordinary debt action
in order to collect the tax. 2
On balance, the combination of net and gross income taxes as adopted
by the last General Assembly would not appear to present serious constitutional
problems, if challenged under the commerce clause.
CONCLUSION
Although the 93rd General Assembly considered and dealt with the problem
of taxing interstate business, the 94th General Assembly may well have to face
the problem again in 1965. It is certainly possible that the adjusted gross income
tax act may be held unconstitutional in its entirety before next January. If it-is,
the state will revert to the gross income tax's at the increased rates mentioned
earlier,"' leaving interstate commerce again exempt from the state income tax.
Even if the adjusted gross income tax act is upheld, -or is not challenged, there
will undoubtedly be pressures in the next General Assembly to modify the tax if
not actually to repeal 'it. At such time the alternative taxes treated in this
article would almost certainly come under careful study. But whatever the specific
means whereby interstate commerce is taxed, it appears certain that from now
on such commerce will pay its way in Indiana.
68 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 462 (1959).
The collection provisions of Minnesota's income tax law are found in MINN. STAT. ANN.
290.48 (1962).
69 IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-3237 (c) (Burns 1963 Special Supp.).
70 Id. § 64-3237 (d).
71 Ind. Acts of 1963, Ch. 32, § 705 (Special Session).
72 See St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 (1914) where the 'statute
provided that the certificate to engage in business could be cancelled for failure to pay a license
tax. The court observed that this forfeiture of the right to do business for failure to pay the tax
could be construed as an unconstitutional effort by a state to regulate interstate commerce. But
in this case, the tax was upheld, since the state was attempting to collect the tax only by means
of an ordinary debt action.
73 The 1963 Legislature did not repeal the gross income tax. Corporations remain subject
to it, and individuals will be subject to it should the adjusted gross income tax act'bet held in-
valid. IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-3249 (Burns 1963 Special Supp.). .
74 Supra note 1. ' ," ,.
